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As security and privacy on the web become topics of significant concern, there have been
increased efforts to expedite the deployment of encryption-based transport- and link-layer
protection mechanisms such as HTTPS. Although encryption protects the data being trans-
mitted between a client and a server, site visits generate unique traffic patterns due to
contents of the site and the manner in which the server responds to user requests for site
resources. These patterns can be learned by an adversary, and then be used to predict which
site (or web page within a site) a user is visiting—a technique known as web fingerprinting.
Web fingerprinting allows an adversary to compromise user privacy even in the presence of
encryption mechanisms or anonymity systems, such as the Tor network.
In this thesis, we examine how changes to a site’s configuration (i.e., the size of the site,
site content, hosting strategies, etc.) can influence an adversary’s ability to successfully
fingerprint a user’s visit to a site over the web and Tor. We pay particular attention to the
impact of HTTP/2 and Server Push—new web standards which significantly change network
traffic patterns by altering the order in which site resources are served. Additionally, we ex-
periment with padding site sizes, renaming site resources, and hosting sites from both single
and multiple servers in order to observe the effect of each of these changes on fingerprinting
accuracy.
In order to collect traces from sites that reflect our experimental changes, we create mod-
els of real-world sites and onion services that capture the resource dependency structures of
the original sites. We then modify these models to reflect our desired configuration changes
and serve them via HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 with server push. We collect traces of visits
to these models conducted over the web, as well as the Tor network, and evaluate the per-
formance of state-of-the-art fingerprinting classifiers on both sets of traces. We find that
HTTP/2 with server push can successfully reduce fingerprinting accuracy when compared
to HTTP/1.1, and that real-world sites visited over the web benefit from single-server host-
ing, site padding, and constant-length Huffman-encoded resource names. We also find that
HTTP/2 with server push reduces the fingerprintability of regular sites and onion services
accessed over the Tor network, but inconsistencies in our data prevent us from drawing
any conclusions regarding the efficacy of site padding, resource renaming, and single- vs.
multi-server hosting when fingerprinting Tor traffic. We suggest future work that should
help gather more conclusive results for our Tor experiments.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The protection of user privacy is a major point of concern in the modern web. Protocols
such as HTTPS have been seeing widespread deployment as site developers, researchers, and
browser vendors attempt to curtail adversarial efforts to tamper with or intercept user data
[1]. Virtual private networks are also becoming increasingly popular as a means for users
to practice safer browsing1. Security through encryption and cryptographic means are now
the basis of most modern web protocols and security best-practices—data is encrypted to
prevent an unwanted adversary from reading it, and digital signatures have become the de
facto standard for proving one’s identity on the web.
Anonymity systems—such as the Tor network—have also arisen as an alternative browsing
approach for users concerned about remaining anonymous while browsing the web. Tor
protects user anonymity by ensuring that no hop along a communication pathway is made
aware of the original sender’s identity, or the final destination of the communication. Because
of its ability to protect the identities of clients, the Tor network has become a crucial tool for
proponents of the free-web and users attempting to circumvent state-level censors. It is also
host to numerous hidden onion services, which are not reachable via the regular Internet
and often host sensitive content that may be deemed objectionable by a censoring body.
Link- and transport-layer encryption technologies—such as HTTPS and TLS—are useful
for protecting the integrity and confidentiality of network traffic, and anonymity systems—
such as Tor—are designed to protect the identity of their users from entities within the
network. However, despite the defenses they provide, both mechanisms cannot protect
against an inherent aspect of web browsing across any medium: visiting a specific site
generates a unique pattern of network traffic that can be used to reveal sensitive information
about a user’s browsing. This technique—known as web fingerprinting2—can be used to learn
what site (or page within a site) someone is visiting, by analyzing traffic generated by their
web browser.
The success of a web fingerprinting attack relies on the fact that each web site being
visited has a unique page structure. In order for a browser to display the contents of a page,
it must perform a complex set of interactions with one or more web servers to download all
of the resources used to specify a site’s appearance, structure, and behavior. These client-
server(s) interactions create unique patterns of traffic that are identifiable despite the use
of encryption and various masking strategies [2]. Factors such as packet directions, inter-
1https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/vpn-use-data-privacy-stats/
2We use the term web fingerprinting in place of the popular website fingerprinting as the underlying
techniques apply both within and across sites.
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packet latencies, and the number and size of downloaded resources all contribute towards
constructing a discernible profile for a given web page. New protocols—such as HTTP/2
and its Server Push feature [3]—streamline the client-server interactions by introducing
optimizations over HTTP/1.1 and changing the resulting traffic patterns. Although these
changes are motivated by performance, we aim to investigate what impact they have on web
fingerprinting performance. We are particularly interested in the server push mechanism,
as it fundamentally alters the request-response pattern for downloading site resources—a
change that should reflect quite heavily in the network trace of a site visit. In this study,
we examine how non-intrusive changes to a web page’s content and hosting strategies can
change the profile of client-server traffic patterns, and in turn, impact the success of site
fingerprinting over the web and Tor.
Deployment of the HTTP/2 protocol has been gaining speed, but the use of server push in
the wild is still relatively rare.3. We therefore perform our experiments in a synthetic setting
in which we can serve modern websites over HTTP/2 with server push enabled, regardless
of whether the original sites support the protocol. To make our simulated setting as realistic
as possible, we collect web page models from the 99 most popular sites, as ranked by Alexa
[4], as well as 20 real-world active onion services. These models capture the dependency
structure of the pages, as well as the sizes and types of each individual site resource, thus
capturing the core features that influence the network trace of loading a page. We serve
these models over the web and Tor, and collect network traces of the model sites using both
HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 with server push. In the Tor setting, we also evaluate whether
hosting site resources on a single server provides any benefit over hosting resources across
multiple web servers per site. We use state-of-the-art web fingerprinting techniques [5, 6, 7]
to evaluate each model-configuration’s susceptibility to fingerprinting.
Throughout the remainder of this thesis, we make the following contributions:
1. Measure HTTP/2’s impact on fingerprinting over the web: We find that there
is a notable drop in classifier accuracy when a site is served via HTTP/2 with server
push enabled. Without any other changes to the site’s configuration, HTTP/2 with
server push reduces fingerprinting accuracy from 80% to 74%.
2. Site padding and constant-length Huffman-encoded resource names: We
identify three sources of information that contribute to fingerprintability: the length
of the site name/URL, the names of the resources that are pushed, and the total size of
the page. We investigate the option of padding site models to mitigate the information
3https://http2.netray.io/stats.html
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learned through these sources, and find that with an average padding overhead of 25%
of the site’s original size, fingerprinting accuracy falls to 68%. In order to address
information learned through resource names, we rename all site resources to have names
of the same Huffman-encoded length. This further lowers fingerprinting accuracy to
62%. We note that these figures are comparable to existing padding protocols in the
literature [8, 9, 10] but can be implemented without changing the web transport and
application layer protocols.
3. Measure fingerprintability of padded, HTTP/2-enabled models over Tor:
We extend our findings from fingerprinting over the web to fingerprinting over the Tor
network. We host both regular sites and onion services as models and access them
over the Tor network under various site configurations (e.g. padded vs. unpadded,
HTTP/1.1 vs HTTP/2 with server push). We find that HTTP/2 with server push
seems to marginally lower fingerprinting accuracy over Tor, though not to the same
degree as it does over the regular web. We get mixed results regarding the impact of
site padding on Tor fingerprinting.
4. Single- vs. multi-server resource hosting: We note that real-world sites often
host their resources on multiple web servers. We test whether this has any bearing
on site fingerprintability by hosting each Tor model from a single server, as well as
multiple servers. We find that hosting all site resources from a single server reduces
Tor fingerprinting accuracy for regular sites. However, onion services generally seem
to be more fingerprintable when served from a single server.
We provide a background of web page structure, HTTP/2, Tor, and web fingerprinting in
Chapter 2. We then detail our experiments with measuring the impact of HTTP/2 on web
fingerprinting in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses takeaways from our initial experiments over
the web, and how we might apply them to our next experiments over Tor. Our experiments
with fingerprinting regular sites and onion services over Tor are detailed in Chapter 5, along
with a discussion of the results and how they can be improved moving forward. Finally, we
conclude in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss various aspects of browsing on the modern web, including web
page structure, HTTP/2, and the Tor network. We then describe web fingerprinting and
how the aforementioned mechanisms can impact the success of an adversary attempting to
classify network traffic.
2.1 WEB PAGE STRUCTURE
Modern web pages are content-rich amalgamations of numerous resources that are all
rendered together in a browser to provide users access to the sites and web services they are
familiar with. Some of these resources include images, scripts, fonts, stylesheets, and frames
that may include additional documents. When a user visits a URL, the browser requests
and downloads the site’s base HTML document, which provides the browser with references
to the embedded resources required to fully render the web page. The browser individually
requests and downloads each of these embedded resources, and recursively requests any
resources that may be present in the embedded resources. This process continues until
the browser has fully downloaded all components required to render the site. Figure 2.1
demonstrates a sample web page structure modeled by a dependency graph.
Due to the one-by-one nature of requesting and downloading resources, the time required
to download a site grows linearly with the number of site resources (i.e. the size of the site).
According to the HTTP Archive, the median desktop WordPress site in February 2020 con-
tained 88 embedded resources, and therefore made 88 resource requests [11]. Each of these
requests introduces its own latency, since the size of the resource will directly impact the
number of round trips required to download the resource. This delay compounds with the
latency caused by parsing resources to identify further requests. Importantly, site resources
may be hosted on servers from various domains, meaning that the browser may have to
initiate multiple ClientHello’s and establish multiple TLS connections—each with its own
setup latency. Browsers and web servers have introduced various techniques to streamline
the page load process, including connection reuse, simultaneous parallel connections, incre-
mental resource parsing, resource scheduling and prioritization, etc. While these reduce the


























Figure 2.1: The structure of an example web page. The site resources include HTML doc-
uments (.html), stylesheets (.css), images (.bmp, .png, .jpg), scripts (.js), and fonts (.woff2).
The arrows represent the dependency structure of the page; each resource points to other
resources that it references/causes to be loaded.
2.2 HTTP/2 AND SERVER PUSH
One of the primary culprits behind high latency connections is HTTP/1.1’s tendency
to open multiple TCP connections to a server. Ironically, this solution was engineered in
order to reduce latency by enabling concurrent data streams. However, given the large size
of most modern web pages, the number of concurrent connections can grow too large and
cause network congestion, packet loss, and weaker performance [12]. This performance hit
is further compounded by the fact that HTTP/1.1’s repetitive headers are prone to clogging
the initial TCP congestion window [3]. The SPDY protocol [13]—which has since evolved
into HTTP/2—was developed to address these issues.
These protocols establish a single TCP connection to an endpoint, and multiplex all of
their HTTP requests and responses over the connection, thereby reducing network load. In
order to efficiently pipeline across the single TCP connection, requests can be scheduled
asynchronously, and can be prioritized to prevent head-of-line blocking and ensure that the
most important resources are handled first. HTTP/2 also compresses headers to truncate
redundant header data and allow multiple requests to be compressed into a single packet [3].
2.2.1 Server Push
HTTP/2 also introduces a feature known as server push, which enables the preemptive
serving of site resources. This is motivated by the fact that certain requests from a client
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can allow a server to predict future requests. Consider the site modeled in Figure 2.1. Based
on the dependency tree of the site, it is clear that a client requesting example.html will
certainly end up requesting resources such as welcome.html, welcome.png, etc. Therefore,
when the server receives a request for example.html, it will proactively send resources in the
site dependency tree without waiting for explicit requests from the client.
Under the right circumstances, this ”pushing” can eliminate some of the latency introduced
when a client has to parse an incoming resource and request embedded resources one-by-
one. However, server push does not improve performance in all cases. Wang et al. note that
server push can induce extra overhead by redundantly pushing unneeded or cached resources
depending on push configurations and client latencies [12]. Zimmermann et al. find that
suboptimal push strategies can also stall browser rendering pipelines by pushing resources
in the wrong order [14, 15]. Recent research suggests that optimal push strategies may be
quite complex and involved [16], and determining these strategies is the subject of ongoing
work [17]
One of our goals in this work is to identify the privacy implications of the HTTP/2
server push mechanism under various web fingerprinting schemes. We posture that HTTP/2
with server push fundamentally changes the behavior of site traffic patterns, and that these
changes can somehow impact the success of an adversary attempting to fingerprint users’
browsing sessions.
2.3 THE TOR NETWORK
The Tor network is an anonymity communication system built as an overlay network. It
aims to improve user privacy on TCP-based applications via onion routing—an approach
that ensures that each relay node (or onion router) in a communication pathway only knows
the current packet’s previous and next hop nodes. By building a path—or circuit—across
multiple relays to the endpoint, a client can ensure that no single node in the transmission
gains full knowledge of the participants involved in a communication [18]. By maintaining
this property, onion routing allows Tor users to remain anonymous by separating their iden-
tity from their browsing. As of April, 2020, Tor is used by an estimated 2,000,000 daily
users worldwide, and consists of approximately 7,000 volunteer relays [19].
2.3.1 Tor Circuits
Communication over the Tor network occurs over client-constructed circuits, each con-
taining three relays: an entry guard, a middle relay, and an exit relay. In order to send
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traffic over the circuit, clients use local software known as an onion proxy, which is responsi-
ble for communicating with the entry guard. The onion proxy forwards client traffic to the
entry guard, which then forwards communication to the middle relay. The middle relay will
forward communication to the exit relay, which is responsible for communicating with the
endpoint on the client’s behalf. Note that the entry guard and middle relay will not know the
destination of the communication (provided the client is using end-to-end encryption such as
HTTPS), since the destinations they forward to are the middle and exit relays respectively.
Similarly, the exit relay will not know the original client from which the communication
originates, since its ”client” will be the middle relay. Clients cycle between a set of three
entry guards for 30 to 60 days at a time, and randomly choose a middle and exit relay for
each circuit. Circuits are changed every 10 minutes to prevent deanonymization [20]. Note
that randomly selecting the final two relays in the circuit can lead to variable performance
over the Tor network, depending on latencies between any two hops in the circuit.
Once a client has established a circuit, they can communicate with the destination via
multiple streams. Each of these streams corresponds to a single TCP connection between
the exit relay and the destination server, and this system allows for multiplexed TCP com-
munication over a Tor circuit. Communication over the Tor network utilizes TLS, and data
is sent in fixed-size 512 byte cells [18]. This uniform cell size serves as a rudimentary pro-
tection against adversaries attempting to identify traffic based on individual packet sizes.
As we will see in section 2.4.3, this protection falls short under more nuanced fingerprinting
approaches.
2.3.2 Onion Services
Onion services, also known as location-hidden services, enable users to provide TCP ser-
vices over Tor without revealing their IP address. These services are only available via the
Tor network, and are accessed via self-certifying onion domains ending in .onion.
Rendezvous Points
Since onion services never reveal their IP address, clients must have another way of estab-
lishing a communication with them. This is achieved via the use of rendezvous points. An
onion service establishes several onion routers as introduction points to which a client can
connect to. The client chooses an onion router as their rendezvous point and communicates
the rendezvous point to the onion service via the introduction point. The client will also in-
clude a hash of the service’s public key and an optional authorization token in their message
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to the introduction point. The client and onion service will then establish circuits to the
rendezvous point and begin communication. The service’s hostname will be self-certifying
and is represented as x.y.onion, where x is the authorization token provided by the client,
and y encodes the hash of the service’s public key [18]. While this approach is efficient and
secure, it can lead to human-unreadable hostnames that are comprised of random base32
strings.
Content of Onion Sites
Since they protect the location of servers, onion services are generally used to host services
that would be censored or restricted by a powerful state-level adversary. These services range
from news boards dedicated to free press and anti-censorship, to more illegal operations such
as counterfeit document and weapons marketplaces. A study by Biryukov et al. crawled
the onion service domain space, and determined that 56% of the active services providing
HTTP(S) access were dedicated to politics, anonymity, security, and other generally permit-
ted services or discussions on the regular Internet. However, the remaining 44% was related
to drugs, adult content, counterfeit products, identity theft, and weapons [21].
Due to the sensitive and sometimes illegal nature of their content, many onion services
are the target of governments attempting to shut them down. Note that even benevolent
onion services, such as news and discussion sites dedicated to free speech, may be the target
of large or well-funded adversaries who deem the activity of the service detrimental to their
goals. As such, fingerprinting onion services and their users is of particular interest to
many adversaries worldwide. Recent work has shown that large onion services are easily
fingerprinted despite traffic obfuscation attempts [22].
2.4 WEB FINGERPRINTING
Web fingerprinting (WF) is a technique that allows an adversary to predict and/or identify
a user’s browsing activity by determining patterns or salient features in their web traffic.
Useful features for web fingerprinting include packet sizes, counts, directions, and timings—
all or most of which can be learned even if the traffic is encrypted or being served over an
anonymity system or VPN [23, 24]. As mentioned earlier, web fingerprinting would be useful
to adversaries attempting to censor or block traffic to certain sites, or to build user browsing
profiles. Such adversaries could exist in the form of state-owned ISP’s, or other malicious
middlemen within the network.
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2.4.1 Closed- vs. Open-World
At its core, web fingerprinting is a classification problem in which an adversary wishes to
identify which site—out of a set of possible sites—a user is visiting. In order to do so, the
adversary must gather traffic patterns generated by the set of possible sites, identify features
that may aid in the classification task, and train a machine learning model on the gathered
data. This scenario is referred to as the closed-world, since the adversary is assuming that
the user will only make site visits within a reasonably finite set of websites. In the closed-
world, the adversary has a sufficient number of traffic samples for each of the sites within the
set to train their classifier on. The closed-world approach was favored by many pioneering
WF studies, as its assumptions were sufficient for identifying which features of a site or web
page were susceptible to fingerprinting [25, 26, 27, 28]. However, the approach has come
under scrutiny for not being representative of the real world, in which the set of sites a user
could visit is far too large for any realistic adversary to collect data on and train a classifier
[29, 30]. In order for an adversary to take the closed-world approach and ensure coverage
of the entire Internet, they would have to gather traffic data for every site/web page on the
Internet, which is simply unrealistic.
An alternate strategy which satisfies the shortcomings of the closed-world approach, is
known as the open-world approach. In this scenario, an adversary trains on traffic samples
for a finite set of sites, but assumes that the user may visit sites outside of this set. This
places a greater focus on building classifiers that can generalize, but note that it is impossible
for a classifier to identify a site or page that it has not been trained on. Rather, open-world
classifiers will predict whether a sample occurs within the closed-world on which it was
trained (in which case it also predicts the site), or whether it occurs outside of the set
altogether.
In this study, we take a closed-world approach to our experiments, as we are interested
in identifying how various changes to site configurations can impact the accuracy of a fin-
gerprinting adversary. An open world approach would not render our results invalid or
unrealistic, since a closed-world classifier would in fact achieve higher accuracy than an
open-world one (due to its finite and known sample set). If changes in accuracy apply to a
closed-world scenario, then they will certainly apply to the more general open-world scenario.
2.4.2 Fingerprinting over the Web
It has long been known that object sizes—which are not protected by HTTPS—can reveal
sensitive pieces of information that clue an adversary in on the site a user is visiting [31].
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These findings led to the development of the first WF attacks, which would pinpoint pages
within a single website [25, 32]. Later attempts began to employ the more traditional closed-
world approach, and would identify pages from a set of potential sites [26].
A significant amount of work has gone into engineering the features that are used for web
classification. As machine learning techniques have evolved and classifiers have become more
refined, most approaches have settled on packet direction, order, and size as being the most
important features for fingerprinting success. Some studies have also explored variations and
combinations of these features, such as cumulative sizes of packets in a specific direction [33].
Recent work has noted the importance of packet bursts—a sequence of packets in the same
direction—in fingerprinting [5], as they are representative of the request-response pattern of
a site and can therefore help recover the site structure. We note that HTTP/2 with server
push significantly changes the burst structure by changing the order and frequency at which
resources are served, and thus has the potential to impact fingerprinting success.
Defenses
Initial work on defenses against web fingerprinting focused on ad hoc approaches that
modified some of the aggregate features used in early fingerprinting work [34, 35, 36]; how-
ever, these have been shown to be largely ineffective by more sophisticated machine learning
techniques [37, 2]. Recent studies have focused on variants of constant rate defenses [9, 8]—
where the server and client communicate with each other using a constant-rate stream—as
this approach has a provable bound on the amount of information available to a web fin-
gerprinting attacker, i.e., the total amount of data transferred in each direction (plus the
rate, in cases when it is adjustable). Certain constant-rate defenses even focus specifically
on limiting the information revealed via packet burst sizes [38].
An idealized version of an HTTP/2 page load with server push resembles a constant-
rate download, since a single request from the client is satisfied by a download of all the
resources comprising a page, and as such, should present a limited amount of information
for fingerprinting. Therefore, one of our goals is to evaluate this high-level intuition using
actual HTTP/2 implementations in browsers and web servers.
2.4.3 Fingerprinting over Tor
Since Tor was built for the express purpose of providing user anonymity and privacy,
fingerprinting attacks against Tor traffic can be especially dangerous or compromising. Tor
users access sensitive data over the network—either by using Tor to circumvent censorship
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restrictions, or by accessing onion services—and adversaries who can successfully fingerprint
Tor traffic may use the learned information for malevolent purposes.
The first attempt to fingerprint Tor simply attempted to port early WF approaches to
Tor traffic [28]. The classification only yielded a 3% accuracy with a set of 775 sites, due
to the fact that it focused heavily on packet length frequencies. The use of uniformly sized
512-byte Tor cells means that packet sizes do not serve as a useful classification feature for
an adversary. However, researchers have identified other avenues of fingerprinting success
over the past decade.
It turns out that some of the more nuanced approaches mentioned in section 2.4.2 apply
well to fingerprinting Tor traffic, and can achieve 90-91% accuracy in closed-world scenar-
ios. The k-NN attack makes use of packet orderings and burst patterns [5], the CUMUL
attack measures cumulative packet lengths of sequences of traffic (groups of packets moving
in the same direction) [33], and the k-FP attack makes use of the number of packets in
a particular sequence [6]. All of these approaches share some important aspects in their
classification features—none of them focus on the size of individual packets, and all of them
incorporate packet direction metrics. This strategy has informed the current generation of
Tor fingerprinting, which has adopted deep learning to achieve far more accurate results.
Sirinam et al. introduced Deep Fingerprinting (DF) in 2018, as the first deep learning-
based fingerprinting approach for Tor that outperformed the previously mentioned WF
strategies [7]. This work builds off of earlier attempts to automate feature extraction for WF
attacks via deep learning [39, 40], and achieves a 98.3% accuracy in a closed-world scenario.
Such performance is achieved by learning features from a simple bit-wise representation of
packet directions in the original trace. Later studies have incrementally improved upon DF
by providing more scalable, generalizable, and efficient deep learning models [41, 42, 43],
but all follow the same approach of extracting features from packet direction representa-
tions. Again, we note that HTTP/2 with server push fundamentally changes site packet
sequence frequencies—as all resources are pushed at once given a single request from the
user—and that this change may impact the accuracy of a deep learning approach that relies
heavily on packet direction to make its classification.
Defenses
Proposed WF defenses for Tor also follow a constant-rate philosophy in order to minimize
the information leaked via packet bursts. WTF-PAD uses adaptive padding to only pad
traffic when channel usage is low, thereby making it more difficult to identify concrete
packet bursts [10]. Walkie-Talkie forces the Tor client to communicate with the server in
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half-duplex mode, which causes non-overlapping packet bursts in either direction. Small
amounts of padding and packet delay are added to cause similarities between the traces of
different sites, therefore making classification more challenging [38].
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CHAPTER 3: MEASURING THE IMPACT OF HTTP/2 ON WEB
FINGERPRINTING
In this chapter, we build an understanding of how HTTP/2 and server push impact the
fingerprinting landscape. We also suggest small changes to site configurations that can make
successful fingerprinting of a site more difficult1.
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To understand how HTTP/2 and server push affect fingerprinting, we perform a head-to-
head comparison between HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 with server push. Normally this would
be done by fingerprinting traces collected from sites served via HTTP/1.1, and comparing
the results to traces collected from sites served via HTTP/2. Unfortunately, the deployment
of HTTP/2 among web servers is still sparse, and the use of sever push is even more limited.
In order to address this issue, we create a synthetic experimental environment in which we
can serve the same web pages using both protocols. This allows us to collect traces for
fingerprinting that are representative of both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 deployments.
To ensure that our synthetic traces are realistic, we model the structure of our test web
pages after the structure of actual popular web sites. The following sections describe our ap-
proach for creating and serving these models, as well as the trace collection and fingerprinting
techniques we used.
3.1.1 Constructing Web Page Models
As discussed in Section 2.1, a web page is comprised of a number of different types of
resources that can be represented as a dependency tree. We wanted the model pages for our
synthetic environment to accurately mimic the structure of real web pages, so that they would
be representative of real-world sites. To do so, we first perform a web crawl of the the 100
most popular websites—as listed by the Alexa ranking system [4]—with a headless version
of the Chromium browser. We use the Chrome DevTools protocol2 to intercept network
events such as requestWillBeSent, responseReceived, dataReceived, and loadingFinished. This
allows us to keep track of the requests and responses that are being sent and received by the
browser during the loading of the page. From the responses field in the request metadata,





<l ink rel=” s t y l e s h e e t ” href=” sheet0 . c s s ”>
<script src=” s c r i p t 0 . j s ”></ script>
<body>
<img src=”img0 . g i f ”>
<iframe src=” index1 . html”></ iframe>
< !−−AAAAA[ . . . ] AAA−−>
</body>
Figure 3.1: The top-level HTML file in a web page model, which loads a stylesheet
(sheet0.css), a script (script1.js), an image (img0.gif), and another HTML file in an iframe
(index1.html).
we can extract the type of the resource that is being requested—document (i.e., HTML file),
stylesheet, script, image, or font—as well as its size. Additionally, by tying request URL’s
to specific resources, we are able to learn what previously loaded resource is responsible for
loading another resource—e.g., a script might load a font, a stylesheet might load an image,
etc.—through the initiator information in the responseReceived event.
We then create a web page model that replicates the structure attributes captured during
our crawl. In our model, we create ”dummy” resources that correspond to each resource
in the real page with the same resource type. We also maintain the dependency structure
of the real-world site by inserting necessary references to other resources within the model
resource. For example, in Figure 2.1, the top-level HTML file, example.html, loads an im-
age, welcome.png, another html page, welcome.html, a stylesheet, welcome.css, and a script,
hello.js. Likewise, our top-level model file correspondingly contains references to modeled
versions of each of these resources, as shown in Figure 3.1. It also contains a comment that
pads the model resource to the same size as the original example.html. The padding comment
varies in length depending on the size of the target resource.
Since non-page-root resources can also load dependenciees, we include directives to request
dependencies in any model resource that loads further resources. For example, script0.js,
which models hello.js in Figure 2.1, will include JavaScript commands to load another script,
a stylesheet, a document, an image, and a font; it will then be padded to the same size as
hello.js using comments. To model images, we create a 1× 1 pixel GIF file with a comment
section that pads the object to the size of the original image (we found that serving an
invalid image file would cause the browser to abort the load). The dependency structure of
the resulting model is shown in Figure 3.2



















index0.html script0.js img0.gif sheet0.css font0.woff 
script1.js sheet2.css img1.gif index1.html img2.gif 
sheet1.css 
font1.woff 
Figure 3.2: A model of the example web page from Figure 2.1. The file types and sizes all
match the resources used in original page. The dependency structure closely mimics the
original, but note that there is a deviation in how the font0.woff and sheet1.css are loaded.
is actually used to render some text. We therefore add a text element styled to use the
loaded font inside an HTML file. In our testing, however, we discovered that Chromium
reports that a font load is initiated by the HTML file in which it is used, even if the font
is specified in a separate stylesheet (CSS file). This means that our model will miss a
dependency when a font is loaded by a stylesheet. For this reason, font0.woff in Figure
3.2, which models welcome.woff2 in Figure 2.1, depends only on the main page and not the
stylesheet sheet0.css, which models welcome.css. We found that a similar problem occurs
when a stylesheet loads a second sheet using the @import directive. This results in another
discrepancy for the dependency structure of sheet1.css in Figure 3.2, which models format.css
in Figure 2.1. However, since our goal is to create representative web pages, rather than
perfectly model each site, we determined that these slight deviations to the original page
were acceptable within reason.
To validate the loading behavior of our models, we load the model web pages through
headless Chromium and use the DevTools protocol to note the request and response sizes,
types, and order; we find that the models match the original web page behavior.
3.1.2 Trace Collection
We now detail the methods used to host our model sites, as well as those used to collect the
traces used for fingerprinting. Our site models are hosted using the Caddy web server3, pages
3https://caddyserver.com/
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are loaded via headless Chromium. The Caddy web server supports both HTTP/1.1 and
HTTP/2 with (or without) server push, which allows us to model the differences between
both protocols by making a simple configuration change to the server when hosting our
models. Therefore, we configure the server to use HTTPS and HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2,
depending on the test being performed. We note that some of the modeled websites were
originally served over HTTP, but we use HTTPS in our experiments, motivated by the trend
towards greater HTTPS deployment. In order to best simulate communication between a
client and server on isolated machines and wholly separate networks, the Caddy server and
Chromium browser are run in separate Docker containers connected by an isolated network.
The browser container queries the site model and concurrently runs tcpdump to produce a
PCAP file that serves as our web trace. We process the PCAP file to filter out DNS packets,
omit any TCP packets that carry no data, and record only the sizes, directions, and timings
of each packet. These attributes are then used as input for fingerprinting.
As points of comparison, we also collected packet traces of headless Chromium loading
the original sites.
3.1.3 Classification Techniques
To perform web fingerprinting, we use the features developed by Wang et al. [5] for
their k-nearest neighbors classifier. Each packet stream is converted into a vector of 3766
features capturing distributions of packet counts, sizes, bursts, etc. However, Hayes and
Danezis demonstrate that a random forest classifier using the same set of features achieves a
higher classification accuracy [6]—hence we use a random forest classifier in our work. Later
work has explored using different features [33] as well as deep learning [40] for classification;
however, we use the random forest technique because it allows us to perform an analysis of
feature importance. Having a measure of which features are contributing to fingerprinting
success allows us to formulate techniques to mitigate the impact of those features.
In our classification, we first perform recursive feature elimination with a step size of 100 to
prune the 3766 features down to the 100 most relevant ones. We also compute the accuracy
using all 3766 features, but in our experience, the classifier performs better on the reduced
feature space. In our experiments, we use closed-world classification, as it generally yields
higher classifier performance and thus better highlights the information disparities resulting
from protocol changes.
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Table 3.1: Summary of results.
Experiment Accuracy
Original sites 91.3%± 4.3%
One model per site, HTTP/1.1 99.9%± 0.5%
One model per trace, HTTP/1.1 80.2%± 3.8%
HTTP/2 with server push 74.2%± 4.3%
HTTP/2 without server push 80.4%± 2.5%
HTTP/2 with 25% padding 68.5%± 4.6%
HTTP/2 with 25% padding, padded file names 62.1%± 4.8%
3.2 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We next discuss the experiments we performed and their results. A summary of the
experimental results can be found in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Sites and Models
We collect 30 traces each from the top 100 web sites as ranked by Alexa [4]. Traces are
collected in a round robin fashion to account for changes in a site’s content over the duration
of the collection phase. However, one of the websites was down during our collection, and
we are therefore left with 99 × 30 = 2970 traces for our experiment. We note that our
random forest classifier, as described in 3.1.3, performs very well on these traces: it has a
classification accuracy of 91.3%± 4.3%.4
We use each of the 30 traces to create a unique model for the relevant site. We note that,
as many of the real-world web pages we load are dynamic with constantly changing content,
different traces can—and often do—result in different page models. For example, Figure 3.3
shows that many sites exhibit significant variance in the total size of all the objects that
are downloaded. This creates significant challenges for fingerprinting, when predictions are
partially reliant on classifying resource sizes. For example, when we collect 30 traces using
only a single model per site (i.e., using 1× 99 models), served over HTTP/1.1, our classifier
achieves 99.9%± 0.5% accuracy. On the other hand, using a different model for each trace
and each site (i.e., using 30× 99 models) causes the accuracy to fall to 80.2%± 3.8%.
One point of concern is that the classification accuracy of the synthetic sites is lower
than that of the real sites. We hypothesize that this is due to differences in how resources
are served in our experiment versus the real world. In our experiment, all resources for a
site are served from a single Caddy web server instance, whereas real sites typically access
4All of the accuracy numbers in this chapter are obtained using 10-fold cross-validation; we use two
standard deviations of the accuracy scores across the folds to approximate a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of total page size across 30 traces for each of the 99 sites in
our data set. Each distribution is shown as a box plot, where the dashed line represents
the median, boxes capture the interquartile range, the whiskers represent the range, and
individual points represent absent outliers.
several origins at a time (image servers, ad servers, etc.) in order to load their resources,
using separate connections with potentially varying latencies. We do note that there is a
trend towards serving a large fraction of a site’s resources via content distribution networks
(CDNs) [44, 45], and CDNs are developing technology such as the HTTP/2 origin frame [46]
to allow serving more components via a single server connection. We attempt to address
this issue in Chapter 5 by building site models that incorporate the multi-origin nature of
most sites.
A second factor that may be contributing to the lower accuracy is that we change the
site names of the models to be of a uniform length. We discovered that the size of the
ClientHello packet is directly proportional to the length of the site name, due to the name
being embedded inside a Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. In our data set, the site
name lengths have 3.2 bits of entropy. By padding the names to the same length, we are able
to eliminate this extra source of fingerprinting and focus only on the impact of the protocol.
3.2.2 HTTP/2 Server Push
To evaluate the impact of HTTP/2 with server push on fingerprinting, we configure Caddy
to use HTTP/2 and to push all of the site resources in a model as soon as the top-level HTML
is requested. We then collected 30 × 99 traces using Chromium and tcpdump. The traces
were fingerprinted using the same random forest classifier and yielded a lower accuracy of
74.2%± 4.3%. Therefore, we conclude that HTTP/2 with server push is able to reduce the
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amount of information available to fingerprinting, most likely due to changes it makes to
traffic burst patterns (as hypothesized in 2.2.1).
HTTP/2, of course, introduces a number of other changes over HTTP/1.1 in addition
to sever push. To understand the influence those changes have on our measured HTTP/2-
with-server-push accuracy, we conduct a second set of experiments that use HTTP/2 but
not server push. The resulting accuracy is 80.4%± 2.5%, which is virtually identical to the
HTTP/1.1 scenario.
3.2.3 Reducing Fingerprintability with Padding
As can be observed in Figure 3.3, there is some variability in the total size of the download
between different instances of the same web page. Higher size variability between different
instances of the same site makes it harder to accurately fingerprint that particular site.
However, some pages are significantly less variable; 4 out of 99 sites have exactly the same
total size across all page loads. These sites are therefore easy to fingerprint based on total
size alone. Moreover, there are large disparities in the range of total site sizes: the smallest
site transfers less than 500 KB, whereas the largest transfers over 10 MB. In fact, if we train
a random forest classifier on a single feature—the total number of bytes downloaded—we
get an accuracy of 58.1%± 2.8%.
We therefore consider adding padding to reduce the amount of information that can be
learned from the site size alone. We use a simple padding scheme: if a site transfers k bytes,
we pick x uniformly at random from the range [0, α] and add k ·x bytes of padding, resulting
in an average of kα/2 extra bandwidth overhead. To implement this in our test setting,
we add an extra JavaScript file that contains k · x bytes of comments for each model, and
link to it from the main HTML page of the corresponding model. In practice, to avoid the
overhead associated with parsing the JavaScript dependency, an empty image could be used.
As an alternate approach, the server could possibly be configured to push a padding file not
referenced by any resource in the dependency tree. The results of the padding experiments
are shown in Figure 3.4 for various average padding sizes.
We see that even a small amount of padding results in a reduced accuracy: at 10% average
padding, the accuracy is 70.0%± 7.1%, and with 25%, the accuracy drops to 68.5%± 4.6%.
For comparison, we experiment with serving the padded web page over HTTP/1.1. The
resulting accuracy (at 10% padding) is 79.1%± 4.3%. The web page structure available for
fingerprinting ensures that padding in HTTP/1.1 has little to no effect.
We also try training a classifier on the total padded size alone. We note that the accuracy
is dramatically lower, suggesting that other factors are contributing to fingerprinting success.
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Figure 3.4: Results of adding padding to
pages served with HTTP/2 server push,
compared to the classification results that
only use the total download size.
Figure 3.5: Feature selection for HTTP/2
with 25% padding.
3.2.4 Feature Analysis
To understand what features impact the fingerprinting accuracy of our classifier, we per-
form a feature importance analysis. We first use recursive feature elimination—similarly to
the method described in 3.1.3—to reduce the 100 features down to 20 by eliminating one
feature at each step. We then perform a greedy search to find the most impactful features
among those 20. We start by using each individual feature to classify the data set and using
10-fold cross validation to compute the classification accuracy µi and standard deviation σi.
We then pick the feature yielding the highest accuracy, i∗ = arg maxi µi, and pair it with
all remaining features to calculate µi∗+j to identify the next most significant feature. We let
Si denote the set of the best i features picked in this way; i.e., S1 = {i∗}, S2 = {i∗, j∗}. We
continue the algorithm until the improvement from adding a new feature is less than one
standard deviation, i.e., µSk − σSk < µSk+1 .
Since some feature choices result in similar classification accuracies, instead of picking the
unique set Si at each step, we also consider any sets S
′
i such that µSi −σSi < µS′i +σS′i . This
creates a small combinatorial increase in the number of sets considered, but the approach






When we apply this analysis to the previous classifier that uses HTTP/2 with no padding,
the four features that are selected are (in order):
• 1: total number of packets received
• 3: total page load time
• 3705: maximum burst size
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of values for feature 3727: size of the 12th packet
• 3727: size of the 12th packet in the trace
The accuracy of using these features is shown in Figure 3.5. We note that the first three
features are strongly correlated to the total size of the downloaded data. The last feature,
however, seems quite arbitrary, and is a little unexpected; upon inspection, this packet in
the trace generally ranges from 154 to 156 bytes. However, the distribution is different for
different sites, as shown in Figure 3.6.
Upon further inspection, this packet contains the first Push Promise—an indication to
the client that the server intends to push a resource without requiring a request from the
client—which includes the file name of the first file pushed by the Caddy server. We note
that the name of the first pushed file can range in length from 8 characters (img0.gif) to 10
characters (sheet0.css), depending on the resource file type, which explains the difference in
the lengths.
3.2.5 Site Resource Renaming
Having identified the 12th packet as a significant source of fingerprintability, we now detail
a remedy to nullify this feature. We observe that the file names of site resources present in
HTTP/2 Push Promise packet headers are Huffman encoded. Therefore, it is possible for
different Push Promise packets to vary in size depending on the Huffman encoded bit-length
of the contained file name.
In order to address this issue, we rename all site resources—except index.html—to be of
a constant 61-bit Huffman encoded length. We first pad all of the file extensions (.js, .gif,
etc.) to have a 40-bit Huffman encoded representation. This is done by prepending each
file extension with a string of characters X, such that X.extension can be represented as a
40-bit Huffman encoding. For example, the .js file extension is padded to aabb.js and the
.css extension is padded to bbz.css. Each site resource is then given a unique 3-character
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identifier which can be represented by a 21-bit Huffman encoding. Identifiers are generated
from a set of characters with 7-bit Huffman encodings. This identifier is prepended to the
file’s corresponding Huffman-padded file extension in order to generate the final resource file
name. As an example, a valid rename for a script file would be PETaabb.js.
We observe that enforcing constant Huffman file lengths has a noticeable effect on finger-
printing success when paired with the padding scheme specified in 3.2.3. Classifier accuracy
drops from 68.5%± 4.6% before resource renaming, to 62.1%± 4.8% after renaming.
22
CHAPTER 4: INFORMING AN EXPLORATION OF TOR
FINGERPRINTING
After completing the experiments discussed in Chapter 3, we wanted to shift our focus
towards performing fingerprinting on Tor traffic. More particularly, we wanted to see whether
our findings would hold true in the Tor setting as well. In this chapter, we discuss how the
results of the previous chapter inform the direction and framing of our experiments with
Tor.
4.1 CHANGES TO SITE CONFIGURATION
We start by observing how different changes in site configuration impacted classification
accuracy for our random forest classifier. These variations included padding site names to the
same length, serving the site via HTTP/2 with server push, adding padding to each model,
and renaming model resources to constant-length Huffman-encoded names. All of these
adjustments managed to decrease classification accuracy compared to the model baseline
of 80.2% ± 3.8%. Our most significant decrease in accuracy (62.1% ± 4.8%) came when
all of these site configuration changes were applied simultaneously. Given that Tor traffic
patterns exhibit different behavior than regular web traffic, we frame our next experiments to
understand whether the aforementioned changes can provide the same (or similar) benefits
under a Tor browsing context. Essentially, we aim to conclude whether a change that reduces
fingerprinting accuracy over the regular Internet will also reduce fingerprinting accuracy over
Tor.
4.1.1 Onion Services
Tor also provides a unique opportunity to measure our site configuration changes under
a fundamentally different model—onion services. As detailed in 2.3.2, connecting to an
onion service is a more involved process than connecting to a regular service over the Tor
network, as a rendezvous point must be established for traffic to funnel through. We are
curious to see whether the idiosyncrasies of onion services impact their susceptibility to our
configuration changes, and if so, to what degree. Since the safety of onion services is heavily
tied to their ability to remain anonymous and unidentifiable, we believe that it is important
to understand what strategies can be used to make fingerprinting onion services as difficult
as possible. By looking at the results of Chapter 3, we hypothesize that the site changes we
introduced may make onion services harder to fingerprint.
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4.1.2 Gaming the State-of-the-Art
All state-of-the-art Tor fingerprinting techniques rely on deep learning approaches that
focus primarily on a single source of feature extraction: packet direction. We note that
frequencies of packets heading in either direction are heavily tied to the traffic burst patterns
of a given site. The more bursts present in a packet trace, the more transients that can be
picked up by the classifier to build a profile of the site. Importantly, HTTP/2 with server
push drastically changes the packet burst patterns exhibited during a site load by pushing
all resources at once, rather than waiting for individual requests for each resource. This
should, in theory, reduce the number of bursts in a packet trace, thereby making it more
difficult for the classifier to extract features. We therefore want to test whether HTTP/2
with server push adversely affects the accuracy of state-of-the-art Tor classifiers by nature
of their own classification strategies.
4.2 HOSTING SITE RESOURCES ACROSS MULTIPLE SERVERS
As noted in 3.2.1, our original site models are all served from a single server per model.
This is not representative of real-world sites, which often host resources across multiple
servers and require clients to request these resources from their respective servers. Therefore,
we attempt to remedy this issue moving forward by creating site models that host resources
across multiple server instances. We also see whether this change in how sites are hosted
has an impact on our classification success across both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 scenarios.
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CHAPTER 5: MEASURING THE IMPACT OF HTTP/2 AND SITE
HOSTING CONFIGURATIONS ON FINGERPRINTING OVER THE TOR
NETWORK
This chapter covers our experiments with fingerprinting site models over the Tor network
under conditions engineered in Chapter 3. We also build site models that serve resources
from multiple virtual servers in order to more closely represent real-world site hosting. Addi-
tionally, we examine how these conditions affect fingerprinting performance on onion services.
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Our general approach to setting up our Tor testbed remains relatively similar to the
previous experiment. Real-world sites are still modeled in order to be re-hosted under our
engineered configurations. However, certain nuances of multi-host site representations, onion
services, and communication over the Tor network cause us to make slight changes to the
way we model, host, and communicate with our site models.
5.1.1 Constructing Multi-host Web Page Models
In this experiment, we construct site models for the 20 most popular sites—as listed by
the Alexa ranking system [4]—under two representations: single-host (where all resources
are served from the same server) and multi-host (where resources are served from multiple
servers as deduced from the original site traces). We create 30 models per site under each
representation, and single-host site models are constructed in the same manner detailed in
3.1.1.
Constructing multi-host site models requires us to pay closer attention to the originating
server of each resource, as detailed by the server value in the responses field of the request
metadata. For each site model, we separate resources based on the domain names of their
hosting server. Consider a model of the homepage for the Chinese web portal QQ, qq.com.
All resources served from the homepage will be denoted by a server value of qq.com. Other
resources from the homepage may be served from different servers, such as apis.map.qq.com,
btrace.qq.com, and view.inews.qq.com among other locations. The server value of these
resources reveals them as such.
A new model Caddy server is created for each host accessed throughout the page load, and
each is responsible for hosting the resources served by the corresponding host. Importantly,
the only model server that has an index.html file is the model homepage server, since this
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<head>
<l ink rel=” s t y l e s h e e t ” href=” sheet0 . c s s ”>
<script src=
” https : //www−g s t a t i c−com . t o r s i t e s . t t a t . xyz/ s c r i p t 0 . j s ”>
</ script>
<body>
<img src=” https : // i−yt−img−com . t o r s i t e s . t t a t . xyz/img0 . g i f ”>
<iframe src=” index1 . html”></ iframe>
< !−−AAAAA[ . . . ] AAA−−>
</body>
Figure 5.1: The top-level HTML file in a web page model, which loads a stylesheet
(sheet0.css) and another HTML file (index1.html) from the top-level server. The script
(script1.js) and image (img0.gif) are sourced from different model servers as denoted by
their URLs.
is the server that will be handling the incoming site request. The site dependency tree is
built in the same manner as our single-host models, but references to resources hosted on
servers other than the requesting server are made via complete URLs indicating the server
and filename of the target resource. This is necessary because the client must be able to
request each foreign resource from a separate server with its own unique URL. An example
index.html snippet for a multi-host model is given in Figure 5.1.
In this example, the model consists of 3 servers—the top level responding server hosting
index.html, index1.html, and sheet0.css; and 2 external hosts, www-gstatic-com.torsites.ttat.xyz
and i-yt-img-com.torsites.ttat.xyz, responsible for hosting script0.css and img0.gif respec-
tively. www-gstatic-com.torsites.ttat.xyz is the model representation of the real-world host,
www.gstatic.com, and i-yt-img-com.torsites.ttat.xyz represents real-world host, i.yt.img.com.
Note that resources loaded from external hosts may also reference resources stored on
other external hosts. These resources must specify the full URLs of their target resources.
This is especially important when a script is using the document.write directive to modify
the top-level index.html to request an external target resource. Even if the target resource
is hosted locally from the perspective of the writing script (i.e. on the same server as the
script performing the document.write), it is an external resource from the perspective of the
client, since it is hosted on a different server than the top-level responding host. As such, a
full URL must be specified to ensure that the client requests the resource from the correct
destination after parsing the modified index.html.
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5.1.2 Modeling Onion Services
In order to test our configuration changes on more critical and Tor-unique browsing, we
create single- and multi-host models for 20 different onion services. Once again, we create 30
models per site under each representation. While there are onion directories which provide
lists of various onion services by category, they are not reliable for maintaining up-to-date
lists of active services. Onion services often periodically change their hostname, or are
subject to being taken down or moved, and as a result, many entries in the aforementioned
directories point to inactive links. Instead, we use the regularly updated and filtered Real-
World Onion Sites repository1 to select 20 active onion services to model. We note that
this repository performs content filtering to only include ”clean” services (i.e. no nudity,
exploitation, drugs, etc.), and excludes sites with an “onion-only” presence. Although this
biases the content of our example sites, we argue that it makes no impact on the validity of
our experiments, which are focused on fingerprinting onion services based on their structure
and mechanisms.
Since onion services are only accessible via the Tor network, we cannot use the Chromium
browser as-is to communicate with them. Instead, we modify the Mida web measurement
tool2 to access the Tor network via the Tor SOCKS proxy. Each Mida crawl is executed in
its own Docker container, and outputs crawl metadata that is used to build a site model.
Single-host site models are built as described in 3.1.1, and multi-host models are built under
guidelines similar to those outlined in 5.1.1. There is, however, one key distinction: since we
want to gather traces that are representative of traffic to an onion service, we must host the
models as onion services themselves. This involves establishing 20× 30 = 600 unique onion
services—one for each of our site models—and pointing each onion service to the server
responsible for hosting its corresponding model’s homepage. We achieve this by adding the
snippet of code shown in Figure 5.2 to the torrc of our host system and restarting the
Tor daemon. This causes the Tor daemon to establish onion service descriptors for each
service—detailing introduction points and the service’s public key—and publish them to the
directory server, thereby making our onion services publicly accessible.
We note that our multi-host onion service models make a few digressions from their original
representations. It is possible for an onion service site external resource to be hosted on
another onion service rather than a regular web server, and we observed this behavior in a
few of the services that we modeled. However, due to time constraints, we were not able to




HiddenServ iceDir / var / l i b / to r/<model−name>
HiddenServicePort 443 127 .0 . 0 . 1 : <model−port>
Figure 5.2: The configuration lines added to the torrc for each onion service we wish
to establish. For each model, we replace <model-name> with the model’s name, and
<model-port> with the port on which the local server is hosting the model. This allows us
to tie a public key/onion hostname to each model, and to redirect incoming HTTPS requests
to the required server port.
in the number of onion services we needed to establish, and would greatly increase the time
required for our Tor daemon to publish the onion service descriptors. Therefore, we only host
the model homepage and resources served by the home server on our model onion services;
all external resources are hosted by regular HTTPS server instances.
5.1.3 Trace Collection
In order to gather our model traces over the Tor network and model a Tor browsing
context, we use a Dockerized version of the Mida web measurement tool, which uses headless
Chromium to contact sites via a Tor SOCKS proxy. The proxy establishes a connection with
a Tor entry guard before serving as the browser’s access point to the Tor network. Each trace
is collected from a separate Dockerized Mida instance, meaning that a fresh Tor connection
is established for each crawl. This ensures that our trace collection gathers examples across
a wide variety of Tor circuits and provides greater coverage of potential user connection
characteristics. After the crawl has completed, each Docker container outputs a PCAP file
which we use as our web trace. The trace is filtered to exclude any non-IPv4 and non-TCP
packets before being processed for classification.
We once again host our site models using the Caddy web server over HTTPS. This allows
us to serve models over both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 with server push. Site models each
have their own unique URL, are hosted on a separate machine from the trace collector,
and are hosted simultaneously via a single Caddy server which parses incoming requests
and serves the desired site. This means we are able to collect traces from model A as well
as model B without having to start a fresh server instance for model B. Since Tor exit
relays must resolve each unique URL and each crawl is conducted from a separate Docker
container with a unique Tor circuit, our hosting method should adequately model real-world
communication to separate URLs in both single- and multi-host settings.
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5.1.4 Classification Techniques
We perform closed-world fingerprinting of our traces with the Deep Fingerprinting (DF)
classifier3, as developed by Sirinam et al. [7]. The neural network is run with the hyperpa-
rameters specified in the original work, and we process our packet traces to satisfy the input
constraints of the DF classifier. Each trace is divided into packets of 1500 bytes each, and
the directions of these packets are recorded as a vector with elements in the range [−1,+1].
Outgoing packets from the client (the Mida Docker container) are recorded as a +1, and
incoming packets to the client are recorded as a −1. If the trace exceeds 5000 packets in
length, only the first 5000 packets are recorded; likewise, traces that do not reach a length
of 5000 packets have their vectors zero-padded to a length of 5000 elements. This data rep-
resentation is noticeably simpler and more lightweight than what was used for our random
forest classifier in Chapter 3, since the DF classifier relies entirely on packet directions in
order to perform feature extraction. As a result, we can ignore metrics such as packet size.
More advanced deep learning-based Tor fingerprinting approaches have been designed
in the year following DF’s release, including Var-CNN [42] and triplet fingerprinting [41].
These approaches focus on constructing deep learning classifiers that can achieve strong
performance with more realistic adversarial models, i.e. less training data gathered over a
much more limited set of sites. However, we use DF as our classifier for this work since it is
the best documented and most accessible implementation available, and since we are focused
on recognizing trends in fingerprinting given site configurations rather than commenting on
the outright accuracy or usability of our classifier.
5.2 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We conduct a total of 12 classifications split evenly between one of two scenarios: classify-
ing regular sites and classifying onion services. Each scenario is tested with 6 experiments,
as detailed below. A summary of the experimental results can be found in Table 5.1.
1. Unpadded models, single host, HTTP/1.1: The control models for single-host
testing. Models are served from a single host and do not have any of the anti-
fingerprinting mechanisms introduced in Chapter 3. Models do not possess 25%
padding or resource filenames padded to a constant Huffman length. Models are served
via HTTP/1.1.
2. Padded models, single host, HTTP/1.1: Models are served from a single host
3https://github.com/deep-fingerprinting/df
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1. Unpadded, single host, HTTP/1.1 58.0%± 3.8%
2. Padded, single host, HTTP/1.1 54.9%± 7.8%
3. Padded, single host, HTTP/2 with server push 54.7%± 5.8%
4. Unpadded, multiple hosts, HTTP/1.1 67.1%± 7.5%
5. Padded, multiple hosts, HTTP/1.1 68.2%± 6.3%
6. Padded, multiple hosts, HTTP/2 with server push 65.7%± 5.4%
Onion
services
7. Unpadded, single host, HTTP/1.1 76.7%± 7.2%
8. Padded, single host, HTTP/1.1 78.3%± 7.2%
9. Padded, single host, HTTP/2 with server push 56.7%± 2.7%
10. Unpadded, multiple hosts, HTTP/1.1 75.2%± 5.3%
11. Padded, multiple hosts, HTTP/1.1 65.53%± 13.0%
12. Padded, multiple hosts, HTTP/2 with server push 65.5%± 7.8%
with 25% padding and resource filenames padded to a constant Huffman length. Mod-
els are served via HTTP/1.1.
3. Padded models, single host, HTTP/2 with server push: Models are served
from a single host with 25% padding and resource filenames padded to a constant
Huffman length. Models are served via HTTP/2 with server push enabled.
4. Unpadded models, multiple hosts, HTTP/1.1: The control models for multi-
host testing. Models are served from multiple hosts and do not have any of the
anti-fingerprinting mechanisms introduced in Chapter 3. Models do not possess 25%
padding or resource filenames padded to a constant Huffman length. Models are served
via HTTP/1.1.
5. Padded models, multiple hosts, HTTP/1.1: Models are served from multiple
hosts with 25% padding and resource filenames padded to a constant Huffman length.
Models are served via HTTP/1.1.
6. Padded models, multiple hosts, HTTP/2 with server push: Models are served
from a single host with 25% padding and resource filenames padded to a constant
Huffman length. Models are served via HTTP/2 with server push enabled.
5.2.1 Collecting Classification Data
Similarly to our experiments in Chapter 3, we collect 30 traces for each of the sites we wish
to model (both regular and onion services). Traces are once again collected in a round-robin
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fashion to account for site content changes over the duration of the collection period. Once
the sites have been modeled and hosted using the configurations required for the desired
experiment (e.g. single- vs. multi-host, HTTP/1.1 vs HTTP/2, etc.), we collect 5 traces per
site model—each from a separate Mida run—giving us a total of 30 × 5 = 150 traces per
model. Over a set of 20 sites per experiment, this yields a final dataset of 150× 20 = 3000
traces per experiment with which to train and test the DF classifier. Since each model crawl
establishes a new Tor circuit, we have the opportunity to model communication through a
wide range of Tor entry guards; in fact, throughout our experiments across both regular and
onion services, we establish Tor circuits through 2493 unique entry guard relays. Considering
that the Tor network only consists of about 7000 total relays, this likely means our models
were collected over circuits spanning a fair portion of the overall Tor network.
Following the methodology used by Sirinam et al. to evaluate their DF classifier [7], we
split each dataset into training, testing, and validation sets based on an 80%/10%/10% split.
For each of the 20 sites being classified, we randomly sample 120 out of its 150 traces and
add them to the overall training set for the experiment. Out of the remaining 30 traces, we
randomly sample 15 for the experiment’s validation set and add the remaining 15 to the test
set. After this has been done for all 20 sites, we are left with a training set of 2400 traces,
and 300-trace testing and validation sets.
In order to mitigate any biases caused by unfavorable or favorable data splits, we create 10
separate datasets for each of the 12 classifications. Each of these datasets is independently
sampled from the same set of traces, and allows us to evaluate classifier performance across
a wider range of training and testing data. The accuracy scores reported throughout the
remainder of this chapter are calculated by taking the mean accuracy of the 10 trials for
each classification ± a single standard deviation of the accuracies.
5.2.2 Unpadded vs. Padded Site Models
The first goal of these experiments was to see whether padding the site models as we did
in Chapter 3 would cause any decrease in fingerprinting accuracy when sites were visited
over Tor. To this end, we compare the results of unpadded models served over HTTP/1.1
to those of padded models served over HTTP/1.1. We note that for regular sites served via
a single host, and onion sites served via multiple hosts, adding padding manages to decrease
classification accuracy; in the case of regular sites, accuracy drops from 58.0% ± 3.8% to
54.9% ± 7.8%, and in the case of onion services, we see a drop from 75.2% ± 5.3% to
65.5%± 13.0%.
However, regular sites served from multiple hosts and onion services served from a single
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host show little difference in accuracy when comparing padded and unpadded models. In
fact, the padded models in both of these cases yield a marginally higher classification accu-
racy than the standard unpadded models; we see an accuracy increase from 67.1% ± 7.5%
to 68.2%±6.3% for regular site models, and an increase from 76.7%±7.2% to 78.3%±7.2%
for onion services.
Based on these results, we cannot draw any confident conclusions about the efficacy of
site padding as a fingerprinting defense over Tor. While we observe decreased classification
accuracy in some cases, we also see relatively unchanged and slightly higher accuracies in
other cases. This could be due to faults in our data (discussed in 5.3), or more complex
factors such as the relationships between Tor cells and site content, or idiosyncrasies in the
traffic patterns of onion services.
5.2.3 HTTP/1.1 vs. HTTP/2 with Server Push
When comparing the results of padded models collected over HTTP/2 with server push,
to those of padded models collected over HTTP/1.1, we see a general trend indicating that
HTTP/2 with server push could make Tor fingerprinting slightly less accurate. In the case
of single-host regular site models, we see a reduction in accuracy—albeit a small one—
from 54.9%± 7.8% when served via HTTP/1.1, to 54.7%± 5.8% when served via HTTP/2
with server push. Likewise, multi-host regular site models exhibit an accuracy drop from
68.2%± 6.3% to 65.7%± 5.4%.
The largest drop in classification accuracy is seen with onion services hosted via a single
host. While serving these models over HTTP/1.1 yields a classification accuracy of 78.3%±
7.2%, using HTTP/2 with server push sees the classifier fall to an accuracy of 56.7%±2.7%.
This accuracy drop, however, is not reflected as dramatically in the multi-host onion service
models. The classification accuracies for these models are virtually identical regardless of
which protocol they are served with. Serving them via HTTP/1.1 yields an accuracy of
65.53% ± 13.0%, which is negligibly higher than the 65.5% ± 7.8% accuracy achieved with
HTTP/2 and server push. Regardless, we believe that the general trend demonstrates that
HTTP/2 with server push can provide a certain degree of fingerprinting protection over
regular HTTP/1.1.
5.2.4 Single- vs. Multi-host Models
Coming into this experiment, we believed that serving site models over multiple hosts
would more closely represent real-world site structure, and would therefore yield higher
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accuracies from fingerprinting techniques designed for fingerprinting real-world sites. If this
were the case, then we would be able to recommend serving sites from a single host as a
potential fingerprinting defense. We see this assumption reflected in the case of our regular
site models—experiments 4, 5, and 6 all achieve higher classification accuracies than 1, 2,
and 3 (see Table 5.1).
However, we do not see the same results in our onion service models. With the exception
of models served via HTTP/2—which see single-host models yield a classification accuracy
of 56.7% ± 2.7% compared to multi-host models’ 65.5% ± 7.8%—our onion services are, in
fact, less fingerprintable when served via multiple hosts.
Once again, we cannot make a decisive claim as to whether serving sites from a single host
is an effective fingerprinting defense given the discrepancies in results. It appears as though
regular sites benefit from being served via a single host, and perhaps testing non-Tor models
with multiple hosts (as suggested in Chapter 3) would shed further light on this hypothesis.
5.2.5 Regular Sites vs. Onion Services
As a general observation, we note that our onion service models are far more fingerprintable
than our models of regular sites. We see 3 onion service experiments with classification
accuracies exceeding 70%, while the most accurate regular site experiment has an accuracy of
roughly 68%. Similarly, the onion service experiment with the lowest classification accuracy
of 56.7% ± 2.7% is still more fingerprintable than the 2 least fingerprintable regular site
experiments.
This increased fingerprintability is concerning given the highly sensitive nature of many
onion services, and the risky stakes under which their users operate. Given that the world of
onion services and their users is far smaller than that of regular sites, an adversary who can
successfully fingerprint a user’s connection to an onion service may be able to do significant
and actionable damage. While the observed accuracies could be due to issues with our
data, if they are indeed representative of the fingerprintability of real-world onion services
compared to regular sites, they may have some interesting implications.
5.3 EVALUATION OF RESULTS
In this section, we take a closer look at our results to determine why they exhibit certain
patterns. We address the issues present in our experiments and make suggestions for future
work.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of experiment accuracies across 10 classification trials. Accuracies
for each experiment are sorted in increasing order
5.3.1 Baseline Classifier Accuracy
After running the DF classifier on 10 datasets for each of the 12 experiments, we get the
results listed in Table 5.1. We note that our accuracies for the unpadded models (which serve
as our base representations of sites) range from 58.0% ± 3.8% to 76.7% ± 7.2% depending
on the experiment. Strangely, these are far lower than the reported baseline accuracies for
the DF classifier; Sirinam et al. demonstrate that the DF classifier achieves 90% accuracy
in their experiments with just 50 traces per site, and with 1000 traces per site, can achieve
98.3% accuracy [7].
We believe that this discrepancy in overall accuracy is likely due to faults in our model
construction, which are making them inconsistent with real world sites and onion services.
As an example, our multi-host onion service models did not host external resources on other
onion services, even though we observed this behavior in our crawls of real-world onion
services. Given more time, we would re-create our models to remedy this issue. Future
work on this project should certainly involve a closer examination of our model-construction
strategies, as well as our site-hosting methodologies to ensure that they are as realistic and
representative as possible.
5.3.2 Accuracy Spreads Within Experiments
We observe that the accuracies of numerous experiments fluctuate heavily across their
spread of trials, as demonstrated in Figure 5.3. For example, Experiment 11 achieves a wide
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spread of accuracies, ranging from as low as 45% to as high as 82%. These large variations
across such a small sample space are likely the reason for our inconclusive data.
We believe that the demonstrated distribution is caused by poorly constructed datasets for
certain trials. Since we are randomly sampling traces into training, validation, and testing
sets, the lower accuracy trials occur when the test set is constructed with classes that are
less present in the training set. Since we are reporting the classification accuracy as the
mean of the 10 trials per experiment, a few poorly constructed datasets—and therefore,
poor classifications—will skew the final results far more heavily than if we were to conduct
more trials. Future work in this space would involve conducting more classification trials
with more varied datasets in order to smooth out the results shown in Figure 5.3.
5.3.3 Additional Future Work
For future revisions of this experiment, we would begin by collecting more traces over a
wider variety of sites (both regular and onion services). We limited ourselves to 20 sites for
each type of model due to time restraints, but it would be far more valuable to test Tor
fingerprinting over larger closed- and open-world scenarios which are more representative of
real-world adversarial scenarios. Furthermore, we would evaluate our models under more
recent deep learning-based classifiers, such as Var-CNN [42], and triplet fingerprinting [41].
Knowledge gained through these experiments could also be used to conduct a more thor-
ough investigation of onion service fingerprintability. It would be interesting to explore how
changes in site configuration impact onion services of different categories, such as news ser-
vices vs. video hosting services. Understanding these implications could inform which types
of services are most at risk, and what defenses they can employ to remain anonymous.
Finally, we would experiment with more nuanced HTTP/2 server push configurations. As
suggested by previous work [14, 15, 17], push configurations can be extremely involved and
require significant engineering to perform optimally. We would therefore attempt to further
understand server push best-practice, and would create our site models respectively.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Despite efforts to bolster web security via improved cryptographic measures and the adop-
tion of more secure protocols, web fingerprinting poses a serious threat to the privacy and
safety of users online. Not only does it allow an adversary to learn what sites and ser-
vices users are accessing, but it gives malicious adversaries the knowledge required to target
these services in more coordinated efforts. A web fingerprinting attack can even be successful
against the traffic of anonymity systems such as Tor, which are host to users accessing critical
and sensitive data. Early ad hoc defenses against web fingerprinting were easily circumvented
with more advanced fingerprinting strategies, and newer defenses focus on constant-rate so-
lutions that often require changes to transport and application layer protocols—changes
that make adopting the defenses costly and difficult to deploy at a wide scale. In this thesis,
we explored the feasibility and effectiveness of using changes to a site’s configuration as a
lightweight, easy-to-deploy fingerprinting defense.
We examined the impact of various factors—including HTTP/2 with server push, site
padding, and single- vs. multi-server resource-hosting—on the accuracy of fingerprinting
over the web and Tor. To achieve this, we created models of websites and onion services by
crawling their real-world counterparts and creating site models that reflected the original
sites’ dependency structures, resources, and sizes. We then modified and hosted these models
as required to test the impact of each of the aforementioned factors on fingerprinting success.
In order to conduct our experiments, site models were hosted via the Caddy server, which
allowed us to serve them via HTTP/2 with server push. Our first experiments involved
measuring fingerprinting performance on the web, and we used a random forest classifier to
fingerprint site visits to each of our models. We found that serving a model via HTTP/2
with server push caused a significant reduction in fingerprinting accuracy when compared
to the same model being served via HTTP/1.1. Additionally, we found that adding a small-
to-moderate amount of padding to a site’s content, as well as renaming all site resource
names to be of a constant Huffman-encoded length, can further decrease fingerprinting ac-
curacy. When we paired HTTP/2 with server push with our padding and resource-renaming
approaches, we were able to reduce fingerprinting accuracy from 80% to 62%.
In our second set of experiments, we used the Deep Fingerprinting classifier to evaluate
fingerprinting performance against our models when they were served via the Tor network. In
addition to conducting experiments with regular sites, we modeled, hosted, and fingerprinted
20 real-world onion services. We also evaluated fingerprinting performance when sites were
served from a single server, as opposed to multiple servers (which more closely resembles
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real-world hosting practices). We found that HTTP/2 with server push marginally lowered
fingerprinting accuracy over Tor, and that serving regular site models from a single server
made them more difficult to fingerprint. However, onion services seemed more fingerprintable
when served from a single server. We were also not able to make a conclusive statement
in regards to the impact of site padding on fingerprinting over Tor; due to inconsistencies
present in our Tor data, we believe that refinements need to be made in our site modeling,
and that more fingerprinting data needs to be gathered as part of future work.
Excluding our Tor inconsistencies, however, we can issue a set of recommendations to most
non-onion service websites that wish to reduce their users’ susceptibility to fingerprinting
over the web:
1. Serve as many site components as possible from a single server
2. Use HTTP/2 and server push on that server (also applicable to onion services)
3. Normalize/pad the length of a site name (SNI) and the request URLs of all site re-
sources
4. Add a small-to-moderate amount of randomized padding in the form of an unused,
pushed web page component
5. Rename site resources to be of a constant Huffman-encoded length
We note that all of these steps can be implemented using existing tools, while allowing
users to browse with off-the-shelf browsers that support the HTTP/2 protocol.
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